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Patient safety has been high on the national 
and international agenda in health care for 
almost a decade. In the United Kingdom, 
reviews of case records have shown that over 
10% of patients experience an adverse event 
while in hospital,1 2 a figure reflected in simi-
lar studies around the world.3 Considerable 
efforts have been made to improve safety, and 
it is natural to ask whether these efforts have 
been well directed. Are patients any safer? The 
answer to this simple question is curiously elu-
sive. Although some aspects of safety are dif-
ficult to measure for technical reasons (defining 
preventability for instance), the main problem 
is that measurement and evaluation have not 
been high on the agenda. We believe that the 
lack of reliable information on safety and qual-
ity of care is hindering improvement in safety 
across the world.
The principal approach to patient safety in 
the UK, United States, and many other coun-
tries has been to establish local and national 
reporting systems; these systems invite volun-
tary reporting of unspecified safety incidents 
with the aim of learning lessons and feeding 
back the findings into the system. However, 
these reporting systems do not effectively detect 
adverse events. In the most recent comparison, 
reporting systems detected only about 6% of 
adverse events found by systematic review 
of records.2 Reporting systems are a valuable 
component of a safety system, but they are 
essentially systems for warning and communi-
cation inside an organisation and, if large scale, 
of detecting rare events not easily detectable by 
other means. They cannot and never will act as 
a measurement system for safety.
Here, we use the example of the UK 
National Health Service to determine whether 
it is possible to assess change in several core 
areas that reflect the safety of health care and, 
if so, what changes are apparent. We focus on 
measures of outcome, in the sense of defin-
able events that happen to patients (infections, 
morbidity, mortality) and on key measures of 
process (such as drug errors). We have not 
considered concepts such as culture or resil-
ience that are held to reflect safety but are not 
proved indices of clinical process or outcome. 
Defining safety is itself a challenge, and we 
do not pretend that the indicators can provide 
more than a crude measure of overall levels 
of safety. The indicators we have chosen are, 
however, all important to patients.
In-hospital mortality
Hospital standardised mortality ratios show 
that in-hospital mortality has fallen signifi-
cantly over the past 11 years.4 When meas-
ured against mortality in 2000-1, the ratio has 
fallen from 114 in 1996-7 to 82 in 2006-7. The 
ratio is adjusted for several factors including 
age, sex, diagnosis, whether the admission is 
planned or unplanned, socioeconomic dep-
rivation, comorbidity, and season, so these 
changes are not simply due to different types 
of patients being admitted to hospital. Shorter 
admissions and changing discharge policies 
may have some bearing on the reduction 
in hospital mortality, as could more general 
trends in mortality (both in and out of hospi-
tal), and a general increase in longevity.5 The 
overall picture, although difficult to interpret, 
suggests that care is at least as safe and may 
be improving.
Mortality after surgery
The Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons has 
collected data for over 20 years. There is evi-
dence of improved outcomes in cardiac sur-
gery, with a reduction in mortality in the north 
of England from 2.4% in 1997-8 to 1.8% in 
2004-5.6 The Scottish Audit of Surgical Mor-
tality has separated unavoidable deaths from 
those in which adverse events contributed to 
the death, providing an indirect measure of 
safety. These data show a clear trend down-
wards, suggesting that efforts to increase 
involvement of consultants in  decision  making 
and improve interaction between surgical, 
anaesthetic, and intensive care teams have 
borne fruit (fig 1).7 Similar trends have been 
observed in data from the National Confi-
dential Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and 
Death8; however, it is not clear whether this 
has translated to improved overall outcomes.
Safety indicators
The United States Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality has made important 
advances by adding safety indicators to its 
existing set of quality indicators,9 though 
there are few long term trend data as yet. 
These indicators have now been translated 
for use with English administrative data.10 
Deaths in healthcare resource groups (groups 
of clinically similar treatments and diagnoses) 
expected to have a low mortality (<0.5%) 
seem to be decreasing significantly, in line 
with trends in national all cause mortality (fig 
2). The incidence of  foreign bodies being left 
during a procedure is also decreasing slightly, 
but this indicator remains suspect as retained 
sutures are sometimes wrongly coded.11 The 
remaining indicators are all increasing, sug-
gesting that care may be getting less safe. 
Is health care getting safer? 
Despite numerous initiatives to improve patient safety, we have little idea whether they have 
worked. Charles Vincent and colleagues argue that we need to develop systematic measures 
Fig 1 | Percentage of deaths during surgery in which 
adverse events in management were identified as 
cause, 1994-20067
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Fig 2 | Changes in rates of nine Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality derived patient 
safety indicators. Hospital Episode Statistics  
1996-7 to 2005-6, England
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However, at this stage of development the 
most likely explanation for the observed trends 
is improved coding; payment by results seems 
to have given a strong incentive to trusts to 
improve their coding.12 13
Healthcare acquired infection
The recognition that reliable data and public 
confidence could never be assured by vol-
untary reporting systems has led to a steady 
increase in the number of healthcare acquired 
infections for which mandatory reporting is 
required. Mandatory reporting for methicillin 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacter-
aemia has been required since April 2001, 
and for Clostridium difficile since January 2004. 
Reporting is public and transparent, with 
monthly reports having to be signed off by the 
trust’s chief executive. This produces strong 
pressure for both accurate data and actual 
reduction of infection. Hospital acquired infec-
tion has moved from being a side issue tackled 
by small harassed infection control teams to a 
major organisational priority.14-16
Voluntary reporting of both MRSA and C 
difficile saw steadily rising rates in the 1990s, 
in part because of improved detection, surveil-
lance, and reporting (fig 3).17 The introduction 
of mandatory reporting and the accompanying 
infection control initiatives are now reducing 
MRSA infections nationally, particularly in the 
acute teaching trusts. The latest data from the 
Health Protection Agency suggest that rates of 
C difficile are now falling, though the agency 
expresses some caution about whether this can 
be sustained in the longer term.18
Drug errors and adverse events
Several UK studies have been published on 
the rate of drug error (tables 1 and 2). Rates of 
administration error are not decreasing, and 
may even be increasing; no trend is appar-
ent for rates of prescribing error. However, 
in both cases direct comparison is limited as 
the studies were conducted in different set-
tings and used different methods.19 20 Adverse 
drug events have many causes, and it will 
never be possible to reduce such events to 
zero. Nevertheless, many are undoubtedly 
preventable, and the overall level of adverse 
drug events would be an important indicator 
of the safety of any healthcare systems. Seri-
ous harm arising from adverse drug reactions 
should be reported through the yellow card 
system and harm arising from drug errors 
through the national reporting and learning 
system, but, in both cases, there is likely to 
be significant under-reporting. More compre-
hensive data can be obtained from reviews 
of medical notes,2 20 21 but studies at regular 
intervals would be needed. We have no idea 
at the moment of national rates or trends for 
adverse drug events.
Effect of lack of measures
The data summarised above present a mixed 
picture. Although there are some difficul-
ties of interpretation, there is reasonable 
evidence for a reduction in overall hospital 
mortality and in mortality after certain types 
of surgery. There is also good evidence for 
a fall in rates of MRSA, and possibly also C 
difficile. Of the nine safety indicators, seven 
show an increase which may reflect increas-
ingly unsafe care or, more probably, better 
coding. For medication errors, adverse drug 
events and indeed most other safety issues 
in the NHS we simply have no idea of long 
term trends.
The lack of reliable data on safety, 
and indeed quality, over time hinders 
 improvement efforts at every level of the 
NHS and makes it impossible to determine 
the effect of the numerous safety initia-
tives. At a national level we have no way 
of assessing the results of national initia-
tives and campaigns that, remarkably, are 
launched with little thought of evaluation. 
The National Audit Office22 has pointed 
out that it  cannot assess value for money 
for patient safety because, although it has 
financial information, there is no safety 
information to set it against. At an organi-
sational level boards, that are accountable 
for safety and quality, have no reliable way 
of  monitoring the safety and quality of care 
in their  organisations. 
At the level of the clinical directorate and 
the clinical team, the problem is more acute 
still. The recent King’s Fund inquiry into 
the safety of maternity services23 pointed 
out that if clinical teams are to ensure or 
improve safety and quality they must have 
data on their performance and an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the trends and features 
of those data over time. League tables and 
national figures are less important than an 
assessment of how a team is doing compared 
with last month and last year. Some obstet-
ric teams had assembled such data, but oth-
ers were completely in the dark about their 
 performance, making any systematic work on 
safety or quality almost impossible.
Finally, we need to consider why it is so 
hard to engage clinical staff in safety and qual-
ity initiatives. Clinical staff care very much 
about safety and quality; on an individual 
Table 1 | UK data on drug administration errors 
Study* Total No of doses Error rate (%)
Ridge et al, 1995 3312 3.5
Dean et al, 1995 2756 3.0
Gethins, 1996 2000 3.2
Ho et al, 1997 2170 5.5
Cavell et al, 1997:
 Electronic prescribing 1295 5.5
 Manual prescribing 1206 5.7
Ogden et al, 1997 2973 5.5
Taxis et al, 1999 842 8.0
Dean et al, 2000:
 Traditional drug trolley 3576 4.3
 From bedside lockers 2491 4.2
Franklin et al, 2006:
 Pre-educational intervention 1796 6.1
 Post-educational intervention 1397 4.2
Franklin et al, 2007:
 Paper based system 1473 7.0
 Electronic prescribing, automated ward based 
dispensing, barcode administration
1139 4.3
*All studies are observational and exclude intravenous administration. Details of references are on bmj.com.
Fig 3 | Trend in methicillin resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus bacteraemia reports received by voluntary 
and mandatory surveillance schemes in England, 
1990-200517
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level it is at the heart of everything they do. 
However, this generally does not extend to 
engaging in improving the performance of the 
broader system. One reason for this is that staff 
do not appreciate the extent of the safety and 
quality problems found in major studies, or do 
not believe they apply to their departments.24 
There is little hope of real engagement with-
out systematic collection of  local data that 
are relevant to clinical concerns and widely 
disseminated and discussed throughout the 
clinical team.
What needs to be done?
The absence of solid measurement of safety, 
and indeed quality, is a worldwide problem. 
Measuring safety in health care is much 
more difficult than measuring safety in other 
domains, where mistakes and injuries are 
fewer, less varied, and can be more clearly 
defined. Outcomes remain the clearest reflec-
tion of harm and are of most concern to 
patients. However, when adverse outcomes 
are rare, we may also need to measure process 
data (such as use of prophylactic antibiotics), 
which are associated with better outcomes. 
Looking further ahead, we might wish to assess 
the levels of hazard, the ability of systems to 
recover when errors occur, and indices such 
as safety culture or staffing levels which might 
reflect overall safety of systems.
At the policy level we need a large shift of 
emphasis and resources, away from unsys-
tematic voluntary reporting towards sys-
tematic measurement. We suggest that the 
National Patient Safety Agency, supported by 
the Healthcare Commission, should make a 
major effort to develop measures of safety and 
quality. This would require increased coordi-
nation of national audits, a process already 
begun with the Patient Safety Observatory, 
and exploration of new methods of assessing 
trends in adverse drug events and other safety 
critical issues. For instance, it would be rela-
tively straightforward to carry out an annual 
review of case records to monitor the overall 
trends in adverse events and see whether any 
progress has been made; however, we now 
need to move towards much more specific 
indices of error and harm that can be moni-
tored and targeted. For drug errors, a national 
screening programme is needed in which a 
suitable sample of patients is studied each year 
using identical methods and definitions. While 
top down targets may play a part in driving 
quality, the most urgent need is to collect a 
broad but manageable spectrum of indicators 
that are genuinely useful to the clinical teams 
that monitor quality and safety day to day.
Existing information systems could record 
safety indices with only minor adjustment. For 
instance, small changes in coding would allow 
clinicians to routinely identify the proportion 
of patient admissions due to adverse drug 
events, something which is currently done 
only for research purposes. This would allow 
clinicians to receive relevant, timely, informa-
tive, well presented analyses. The develop-
ment of electronic medical records provides 
considerable potential for obtaining safety 
data, but much remains to be done to develop 
valid approaches for routine monitoring and 
detection of error and harm.
The careful attention to epidemiology and 
monitoring, which would be a first priority for 
cancer or heart disease, has been completely 
neglected when dealing with the safety and 
quality of care. The Darzi review has placed a 
welcome emphasis on the overall quality and 
safety of care, requiring healthcare organisa-
tions to give the same attention to safety and 
quality data as they currently give to financial 
information. Unless serious efforts are made to 
develop reliable indices of safety and quality, 
we will still be unable to answer the question 
posed by this paper in five years’ time.
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